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WILL THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BILL IMPROVE 
SUBCONTRACTOR CASH-FLOW? 
Tony Cunningham 
Dublin Institute of Technology 
School of Real Estate and Construction Economics 
Background 
„There must be cash flow in the building trade - it is the very lifeblood of the 
enterprise‟. Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd v. Modern 
Engineering (Bristol) Ltd (1973). 
Cash-flow is very important to any construction business and its effective 
management is a key function of quantity surveyors, particularly those working in the 
contracting sector. Businesses are going concerns and must generate sufficient 
incomes to meet their outgoings. Planning, forecasting and controlling cash-flow is a 
vital aspect of operating a successful company. 
Successful cash-flow management is challenging at the best of times, but takes on a 
heightened importance in times of economic difficulty. Irish contractors and 
subcontractors are currently experiencing unprecedented financial difficulties in the 
wake of the banking and property market collapse. These difficulties are compounded 
by the widespread practice of late and underpayment by employers at all levels within 
the Industry. Despite the introduction of prompt payment legislation in 1997 and 
2002, the autumn 2012 Irish Small and Medium Enterprise Association (ISME) Credit 
Watch Survey reports that, on average, firms operating in the Construction Industry 
are currently kept waiting 75 days for payment. Payment delays not only result in 
increased financing costs to the affected firm, but may also cause liquidity problems. 
Occasionally a company that would otherwise be profitable becomes insolvent and 
fails because it simply runs out of cash and is unable to pay its debts when they fall 
due. The Construction Industry has a poor reputation for its high levels of 
insolvencies. 
In an attempt to alleviate these difficulties and improve cash flow within the Industry, 
Senator Feargal Quinn introduced a Private Members Bill, The Construction 
Contracts Bill 2010, (The Bill) in the Seanad. This Bill is the first Private Members 
Bill to be presented to the Oireachtas in over fifty years and aims to tackle the issue of 
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non payment to construction contractors who have completed works by introducing 
statutory requirements regarding payments and providing for adjudication as a quicker 
mechanism for resolving payment disputes. The Bill has recently completed its 
second reading in the Dail where Minister of State Brian Hayes TD, stated that „the 
Government is committed to protecting small building subcontractors that have been 
denied payment from bigger companies‟. (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012a) The Bill 
has been referred to the Select Committee on Public Expenditure and Reform and an 
amended draft originally scheduled to be published in autumn 2012 is due in the near 
future. 
Quantity surveyors are expected to administer contracts in a fair and professional 
manner by clients, colleagues and contractors. Best practice holds that interim 
certificates should be carried out promptly and as accurately as possible. This will 
ensure that contractors and subcontractors are properly paid, thereby minimising cash-
flow difficulties. The surveyor plays a key role in this process by evaluating and 
recommending how much money is to be paid. It is essential that they are competent 
in effectively administering the contract. Failure to carry out this duty or to execute 
their role in an impartial manner not only damages professional reputations but may 
also be breach their contract terms which may lead to legal action for damages. 
Scope 
As the Bill has been introduced primarily to address the issue of non payment of 
subcontractors, it is considered appropriate to examine the problem from the 
subcontractor‟s perspective. The study does not address, in depth, the related topic of 
main contractor payment which has been examined by McCaul (2011). Nor does it 
examine the various matters which give rise to disputes which may delay payment to 
subcontractors such as contracharges, below cost tendering, onerous contract 
conditions, and risk allocation. The study focuses on payment arrangements under 
typical subcontract conditions in Ireland and is framed in the context of a traditionally 
procured building contract arrangement where the design is provided by the employer. 
The related area of dispute resolution is outlined but not examined in depth due to 
scope limitations. 
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Aims and Objectives 
This study investigates whether the proposed legislation will improve payment 
practice and the ease cash-flow pressures among those engaged in the Industry. In 
view of the lack of success of previous legislation to resolve this problem, the 
hypothesis, therefore, is that the proposed legislation will have little effect in 
resolving subcontractor cash-flow problems. The author‟s opening statement is: 
The proposed legislation make little difference to the current situation! 
This cynicism is prompted by the apparent failure of previous legislation in this area 
to have a noticeable effect. It is proposed, therefore, that this study is relevant, timely 
and topical. 
The following objectives have been identified in order to achieve this aim: 
 to examine the importance of cash-flow to contracting companies; 
 to describe subcontract payment arrangements currently being operated; 
 to report on cash-flow difficulties being experienced within the Industry; 
 to describe and analyse the payment provisions of the Construction Contracts Bill 
2010; and 
 to investigate expectations and attitudes towards the proposed legislation. 
The Literature Review 
This Literature Review commences with an outline discussion of the importance of 
cash-flow to the smooth running of construction contracts. It outlines the right to 
payment under contract law and describes the various methods by which payment is 
made. It explains the administrative procedures and components of the payments 
clauses of published standard forms of subcontract for use with the Royal Institute of 
Architects in Ireland (RIAI). It reports the cash-flow difficulties currently being 
experienced within the Industry It sets out the provisions of the Construction 
Contracts Bill 2010 and reviews the expectations of what it may achieve and attitudes 
towards its introduction. 
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The Importance of Cash Flow 
Cash flow may be defined as „the movement of money in and out of the firm‟. 
Consequently, payments made for contract work represent negative cash flow (money 
out) for the client and positive cash flow (money in) for the contractor. (Cooke and 
Williams, 2009). 
The practice of paying contractors regular interim payments is a notable characteristic 
of the Construction Industry. Historically this practice was developed by clients in 
order to fund substantial construction projects which would have represented a large 
percentage of many contractors‟ annual turnover and which, therefore, may have 
beyond their capability to undertake. This arrangement eliminated the need for 
contractors to hold large reserves of working capital and the approach is typically now 
used on all but the smallest of building contracts. (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008) 
Construction, nevertheless, is a credit-based industry and clients typically pay for 
work in arrears. Most construction contracts require contractors to carry out a month's 
work before applying for payment. This period is followed by a period of checking, 
certification and payment which varies depending on the form of contract employed. 
Contractors, in turn, expect even better credit facilities from their subcontractors and 
suppliers in order to reduce the negative cash flow effect of these deferred payments. 
(Cooke and Williams, 2009) This time lag between carrying out the work and being 
paid for it may extend to between 60 to 90 days and beyond. Money held back is 
effectively capital lock-up and this must, in turn be financed, generating interest 
payments. This adds to the cost of building and is counter-productive from a client-
value point of view. 
For most contractors interim certificates form their only source of income, from 
which they must fund the whole of their building operation, including paying wages, 
materials and subcontractors. They depend on full and timely payments to operate 
their business effectively. (Walker and Wilkie, 2002) The effect of late or 
underpayment may range from causing inconvenience to creating major difficulties. 
Where this occurs on a number of separate projects the cumulative effects may be 
catastrophic and may force company insolvency. 
A further complication arises due to the structure of the Construction Industry which 
is organised in a complex network of interlinked and interdependent contractual 
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relationships, referred to as the supply chain. Subcontractors, particularly domestic 
subcontractors, are particularly vulnerable as they typically operate on pay-when-paid 
or extended credit arrangements. In these circumstances it is not difficult to envisage 
situations where the disruption of cash-flow at the head of the supply chain has 
disastrous knock-on effects for downstream subcontractors and suppliers and, which 
in turn, may have equally catastrophic rebound consequences for upstream larger 
contractors who remain ultimately responsible for delivering the works as originally 
agreed. 
The Latham Report, Constructing the Team, stated that „it is absolutely fundamental 
to trust within the construction industry that participants should be paid for the work 
which they have undertaken‟: (1994, p.93). and urged participants to trade fairly, 
particularly in relation to payments and related issues. The Report, referring to a 
survey carried out by a national contractor, identified a number of payment-related 
issues that were creating concerns for subcontractors. The survey revealed that factors 
such as the Industry‟s “macho culture” and “screw the subbie” attitude were 
undermining performance levels. Cooke and Williams (2009) concur and identify an 
industry culture of late payment of subcontractors and suppliers who are commonly 
kept waiting for 60 or 90 days and may be forced to suspend supplies or even 
withdraw credit facilities. Failure to pay contractors on time or in full, therefore, is 
one of the main causes of friction affecting working relationships on site, creating 
unnecessary strain and frustration, and destroying goodwill in the process. This is 
counterproductive. It wastes money, and may ultimately require legal action to 
resolve disputes or to recover outstanding debts. Such situation may persist for years. 
Proper cash-flow distribution throughout the supply chain appears, therefore, to be not 
just a desirable attribute, but an essential component and process within an effective 
construction industry and for the smooth operation of contracts. 
2.2 Managing Cash-flow 
The Contractor’s Perspective 
Cooke and Williams (2009) note that main contractors rely on interim payments to 
pay wages, materials and subcontractors. Figure 2.1 illustrates the standard payment 
terms under the current RIAI form of contract, which shows that contractors typically 
wait upwards of six weeks to be paid. Under the Public Works Contract the payment 
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terms are significantly longer with a 10 working day certification and 15 working day 
honouring period: A typical payment under this contract may take a further three 
weeks to process. 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Work In Progress
Valuation Period
Valuation dates
Produce Certificate (5 Working Days)
Honour Certificate (7 Working Days)
Clear Cheque (5 Working Days)
Average Credit Period
PAYMENT TERMS UNDER RIAI  2012
Month 1 Month 2
 
Figure 2.1 Payment Terms under the RIAI Form of Contract (Adapted Cooke and Williams, 2009) 
This arrangement produces the typical „saw tooth‟ cash-flow profile illustrated in 
Figure 2.2, which shows that the contractor is in a negative cash position for much, if 
not all, of the contract period. Contractors must fund the negative cash-flow from 
working capital and/or overdraft facilities, leaving them vulnerable to liquidity 
problems should the overdraft facility be reduced or withdrawn. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 12 13
CASH -
MONTH
Contract Period Defects Liablity Period
CASH +
Valuation # 1 
etc.
Retention Release
Payment # 1 etc.
Figure 2.2 Typical Contract Cash Flow Profile (Adapted from Cooke and Williams 2009) 
Contractors, however, typically do not pay subcontractors until they are paid by their 
clients. Material suppliers are generally paid 30 days from the end of the month of 
delivery. Plant hire companies usually invoice when the plant has been off-hired from 
site, and payment is normally due a month later. These arrangements produce a very 
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different cash-flow profile which is illustrated in Figure 2.3, showing that the project 
becomes self financing at an early stage of the project. This effect can be amplified by 
negotiating longer credit terms with the supply chain. Cooke and Williams (2009) 
suggest that as a rule of thumb a one month delay in paying creditors improves cash-
flow by approximately 50%; the longer the deferral, the better the cash-flow. They 
comment that managing this delicate process of waiting for payment while delaying 
payment down the supply chain as having become somewhat of an „art form‟ within 
the industry. Contractors, nevertheless, need to be careful that suppliers and 
subcontractors do not become frustrated and withdraw discounts and/or credit 
facilities or commence proceedings to recover debts. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12
CASH -
MONTH
Contract Period Defects Liablity Period
CASH +
Valuation #1 
etc.
Payment #1 etc.
Retention Release
Figure 2.3 Typical Main Contractor‟s Cash Flow Profile (Adapted from Cooke and Williams 2009) 
The Sub-Contractor’s Perspective 
The Subcontractor is typically paid for work in arrears and must finance this cost. A 
typical subcontract cash-flow is illustrated in Fig 2.4 below. This diagram shows a 
three months work package at the start of the construction period. It can be seen that 
this subcontractor has completed the works package before the first of his three 
interim payments is made. In addition, the subcontractor is shown to experience 
negative cash-flow throughout the remaining construction period, only breaking even 
during the defects liability period, and finally returning a profit following the release 
of retention money at the final account stage. This long wait following the normal „get 
in and get out fast‟ approach to building leaves many subcontractors with little 
bargaining power against a main contractor who then becomes a reluctant payer. 
Eaten bread is quickly forgotten and the subcontractor may be left in a precarious 
position as a result! 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12
CASH -
MONTH
Contract Period Defects Liablity Period
CASH + Val 1 etc.
Subcontractor 
Payment #1 etc.
Retention Release
Main Contractor 
Payment #1 
 
Figure 2.4 Typical Subcontractor‟s Cash Flow Profile 
Serious problems may arise where small firms are squeezed between a main 
contractor and a supplier awaiting payment, with one controlling the money and the 
other controlling credit facilities for materials (Fryer, Egbu, Ellis and Gorse, 2004). 
This is the situation that the Bill sets out to address. 
Payment Arrangements for Building Work 
Many instances of late payment or underpayment on construction projects arise as a 
result of a dispute over how the work should be paid for. It is considered beneficial 
therefore to outline the principles underlining payment arrangements in construction 
contracts. 
Murdoch and Hughes (2008) contend that the employer‟s primary contractual 
obligation is to pay the contractor. They advise that the contractor should be paid 
promptly and fully unless there are valid contractual reasons for withholding part of 
the payment. Keane (2001) notes that under the RIAI Standard Form of Contract „The 
employer must honour the Certificate within seven days of presentation. Failure to do 
so is a ground for the Contractor to determine his own employment under the 
contract‟ (p. 267). 
Furst and Ramsey (2001) point out that payment arrangements are governed by the 
terms of the specific contract and that the parties can agree whatever payment 
arrangements they please provided they are legal. They identify three broad categories 
under which the right to payment may arise: lump-sum contracts; contracts other than 
lump-sum and quantum meruit. 
A Lump sum contract is a contract to complete a whole work for a lump sum, for 
example, to build a house for €200,000. In these contracts the contract sum is 
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determined before construction starts, and this amount is entered in the agreement. 
The RIAI Standard Form of Building Contract 2012 is an example of a standard form 
of lump sum building contract. 
A contract may be worded in such a manner that it may be described as an entire 
contract, i.e. that complete performance is a condition precedent to the obligation of 
the employer to pay anything at all. These would normally be confined to small 
domestic or residential contracts, but they are frequently encountered on subcontracts. 
Generally, however, the contract will provide for the right to payments as the work 
proceeds. Contracts also typically operate according to the principle of substantial 
performance where the contractor will be entitled to payment even if the work 
contains some defects or minor omissions which may be set off against full payment. 
In addition variations are normally ordered during the progress of the works, which 
will give rise to adjustments to the contract sum. The actual final account payable will 
therefore often be very different from the original lump sum stated. But the principle 
of payment remains that the lump sum is adjusted: the actual work is not remeasured 
and repriced according to the contract rates. 
Contracts other than for a lump sum are usually categorised as either measure and 
value contracts or cost reimbursement contracts. A Measured contract is where the 
contract sum is accurately known only on completion, and after remeasurement on 
some agreed basis. An example of a re-measured contract in Ireland is the Institute of 
Engineers in Ireland (IEI) Contract. Here the actual work done is measured and 
valued according to a schedule of rates or in a manner laid down in the contract. Bills 
of quantities, where used on these contracts provide a schedule of rates and units of 
measurement which define the work for which that sum is payable. 
Cost reimbursement contracts: often referred to as „dayworks‟ is where the contract 
sum is arrived at on the basis of the actual costs of labour, plant and materials, to 
which is added a fee to cover overheads and profit. This arrangement makes the 
Employer particularly dependent on the integrity, reliability and efficiency of the 
Contractor. There is no standard form of cost plus contract published in the Republic 
of Ireland. 
In certain circumstances the value of work may be determined on the basis of 
Quantum Meruit. This Latin term means „the amount he deserves‟ or „ what the job is 
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worth‟ and denotes a basis for payment whereby the Contractor is paid a reasonable 
amount for the completed work. It is frequently used where there the arrangement 
does not provide for how the work is to be paid. (Furst and Ramsay, 2001) 
Although many „traditional‟ standard forms of contract are described as lump sum 
contracts and the sum is agreed in advanced, it is rare for a contract to be paid 
exclusively by one method and that usually lump sum, measurement and 
reimbursement methods of payment are combined within the individual contract. 
The Late Payment in Commercial Transactions Regulations 2002. 
The Late Payment in Commercial Transactions Regulations 2002 supersede the 
Prompt Payment of Accounts Act 1997 which introduced legislation to ensure timely 
payment but which was limited to public sector contracts. The 2002 Regulations 
stipulate that, in the absence of agreed contracts terms, payment arrangements are 
subject to the Regulations which apply to both public and private sector commercial 
transactions. Debts related to other laws such as insolvency law, interest claims for 
less than five euro and consumer transactions are not governed by the Regulations. 
The Regulations provide that unless otherwise agreed payments outstanding after 30 
days will attract interest at the European Central Bank Rate seven percentage points. 
As of the 1
st
 January 2013 the late payment rate of interest is 7.75% 
The then Department of Trade, Enterprise and Employment (now Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation) claimed that the enactment of the Prompt Payment of Accounts Act 1997 
substantially improved payment times in the public sector and that the average 
payment time was then 51 days. Commenting on the effectiveness of the 2002 
legislation, Mark Fielding, the Chief executive of ISME, stated that it is „working 
against small business and that the New EU Directive due to be transposed into Irish 
law in March [2013] will exacerbate the situation.‟ He added  
We are telling the EU Commission, here today, and our own Government that 
their efforts on late payments have not worked for Ireland and in fact have 
exacerbated the situation by allowing big business and Government agencies 
to contract out of the legislation, thereby abusing their dominant positions. 
The figures prove it. The average credit period in 2002 was 52 days, today, 
after 11 years of legislation, it is 71 days 
The new „sticking plaster‟ Directive is not only ineffective, it is downright 
madness, as it will enshrine 60 days rather than 30 days into legislation 
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It is clear from the quarterly ISME Credit Watch Surveys that there is widespread 
frustration among the small business community that statutory requirements are being 
flouted. The Regulations contain no enforcement mechanisms and small businesses 
appear to be very reluctant to resort to legal action against their clients in order to 
recover debts. 
Standard Forms of Contract 
It is normal practice for substantial building contracts to be let on the basis of standard 
forms of contract. Murdoch and Hughes, (2008) comment that these offer a number of 
benefits in that typically they are negotiated by the various stakeholder representative 
bodies to allocate an equitable distribution of risk, and allow participants to become 
familiar with the contracts provisions. The Latham Report (1994) recommends that 
standard forms should be used without alterations. Amendments may upset the 
balance of the forms and the resulting meaning of the conditions could be disputed. 
Nevertheless standard forms of contract and subcontracts are now widely amended to 
remove areas of risk from their Employers. Occasionally standard forms of building 
contract may not fit the client‟s requirements and a specially drafted agreement may 
be needed. There is an increasing trend towards non-standard agreements particularly 
in the case of multi national companies. 
The most widely used forms of main contract in Ireland are the RIAI contract for 
private sector projects and the GCCC contract for public sector contracts. In addition 
there are a number of published subcontract forms for use on building contracts which 
include: 
 The Construction Industry Federation and the Sub-Contractors and Specialist 
Association Sub Contract (SCSA) (1989) which is discussed below. 
 The Specialist Contract Document (1999) This contract is published by the CIF 
and is reported to by used on approximately 25% of subcontract, however 
contractors are reluctant to use it as it does not operate on a pay when paid basis. 
(CIF, reported in Bowen 2007) 
 The CIF Sub-Contract for use with the PublicWorks Contract entitled "Agreement 
and Conditions of Sub-Contract for use in Conjunction with the Forms of Main 
Contract for Public Works issued by the Department of Finance 2007" and was 
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published in May 2008. This new sub-contract will compliment the new NN 
Specialist Contract where specialists are pre-selected by the Employer and are 
named in the tender documents by the Employer when selecting the Main 
Contractor. 
 Other standard forms of contract or imported forms of subcontract such as the UK 
Dom 1 and Dom 2 
It is suspected, however that a significant percentage, if not most, subcontracts on 
substantial projects are agreed on the main contractors standard terms of business and 
it also claimed that many subcontracts are arranged informally and key terms such as 
payment arrangements and dispute resolution are not agreed. 
The Construction Industry Federation and the Sub-Contractors and Specialist 
Association Sub Contract (1989) 
This sub-contract, commonly referred to as the „White Form‟ (The Form) is the most 
widely used standard form of sub-contract for private sector contracts in Ireland and is 
designed to be used with the RIAI form of main contract. It is approved by the CIF 
and SCSA representing both main contractors‟ and sub-contractors‟ interests. The 
Form is more commonly used on nominated subcontracts than on domestic 
subcontracts, however its use has been commended for domestic subcontracts by 
Kenny J. in Murphy Brothers (Dublin) Limited v. Morris. The Form contains detailed 
provisions regarding payments, insurance, defects, variations, main contractor‟s 
attendance, determination of the contract, and wage and price variations. The most 
relevant provisions relating to this study dealing with payment and set-off and are 
contained in Clauses 11 and 13 of the Form. The main points of these clauses are 
discussed below. Disputes arising under the Sub-Contract may be resolved by the 
arbitration procedures set out in Clause 26 of the Form. 
Clause 11 Payment 
Clause 11 (a) provides that the Contractor shall apply for payment on behalf of the 
Sub-Contractor. Such applications shall include the value of varied work and 
materials on site and shall be made not later than thirty days after receipt of the Sub-
Contractor‟s detailed progress statement. The Contractor shall also give the Sub-
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Contractor at least seven days notice prior to making an application for payment 
under the Main Contract. 
Clause 11 (b) deals with interim payments to the Sub-Contractor. Payment is 
normally due to the Sub-Contractor fourteen days after the Contractor has received a 
Certificate from the Architect. The Contractor is entitled to hold the agreed retention 
amounts on the sub-contract. However, the Sub-Contractor undertakes that he will not 
take steps to enforce the payment until seven days after the Main Contractor has 
actually received payment under the Certificate in question. This, therefore amounts 
to a “pay when paid” form of sub-contract. The provision permitting the Contractor a 
cash discount of 5% for prompt payment within seven days has been removed from 
the 2012 revision of the RIAI Contract and is, therefore, no longer applicable to this 
Sub Contract. 
Clauses 11 (c) and (d) provide that the Main Contractor is to furnish, on demand by 
the Sub-Contractor, details of the amounts included for the subcontract works in the 
Architect‟s Certificates and that payments in respect of the Sub-Contract works made 
to the Contractor are to be held in trust for the Sub-Contractor. 
Sub-clause 11(e) deals with non payment by the Contractor and sets out three 
remedies for the Sub-Contractor. The Sub-Contractor may: 
(a) apply directly to the Employer for payment if the Contractor does not pay the 
certified amounts within seven days of receiving payment or within 14 days from 
the issue of the Architect‟s Certificate, and the Employer may set off such 
amounts against further payment due to the Contractor. 
(b) subject to seven days notice, suspend the works for fourteen days if payment is 
not made within seven days of the Contractor being paid or within 28 days from 
the issue of the Architect‟s Certificate, and in the event of continuing default, 
subsequently determine his own employment. 
(c) charge interest on outstanding amounts if not paid within 28 days from the issue 
of the Architect‟s Certificate. 
It should be noted that the entitlement to seek information directly from the Architect 
or Engineer under sub-clause 11(c) and to obtain payment directly from the Employer 
under sub-clause 11(e) is usually limited to nominated subcontracts or to sub-
contracts where there is a collateral warranty between the sub-contractor and the 
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Employer. The RIAI Form of Contract provides that nominated subcontractors may be 
paid directly by the Employer in the event that the Main Contractor fails to make such 
payments. No such protection is provided to domestic subcontractors under the RIAI 
Form. 
Sub-clause (e) deals with disputes as to Certificates on nominated sub-contracts and 
provides that Contractor may join the Sub-Contractor as claimant in any legal 
proceedings where the Sub-Contractor is aggrieved by amounts certified by the 
Architect or failure by the Employer to honour a Certificate. 
Clause 13 Set Off 
Set off refers to the practice of counter-charging for loss and/or expense incurred as a 
result of failure to properly carry out the work; for example due to defects under 
Clause 9(a), delay and/or disruption under Clause 7(a), site cleaning etc. against sums 
otherwise due for completed work. Few issues cause as much trouble on site as 
resolving these matters. The terms of the Sub-Contract Form allow a restricted set-off. 
Clause 13(1) provides that the Contractor may deduct any amount agreed by the 
subcontractor as due to the Contractor, or awarded in arbitration or litigation from 
money otherwise due under the sub-contract, 
Clause 13(2) states that the Contractor may set-off any claim for loss and/or expense 
incurred due to breach of, or failure to observe the provisions of the sub-contract, by 
the Sub-Contractor, provided that: 
(a) the set-off amount is quantified in detail and with reasonable accuracy by the 
Contractor, and 
(b) the Contractor notifies the Sub-Contractor in writing, at least 17 days before the 
payment becomes due, of his intention to set-off the above amount specifying the 
grounds for the deduction. 
Clause 13(3) states that any such set-off is without prejudice to the rights of the 
Contractor or Sub-Contractor in subsequent proceedings. 
Clause 13(4) states “ the rights of the parties to this subcontract in respect of set-off 
are fully set out in these conditions and no other rights whatsoever shall be implied as 
terms of this subcontract relating to set-off.” 
 
15 
While the White Form seeks to achieve a balance between the main contracting and 
subcontracting sectors, in practice payment problems are still common. Established 
approaches to procurement, management of materials supply contracts and 
subcontracting are generally based on aggressive bargaining between buyer and 
supplier over issues of price, delivery date and payment date, conducted in an 
atmosphere of legalistic mistrust (Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998). Two of the main 
problems with the sub-contractor payment, pay when paid and set-off cross claims are 
prominent features of this Subcontract. The Latham Report and the 1997 Strategic 
Review of the Construction Industry have recommended that pay when paid clauses 
should be prohibited. The problems arising from situations where the employer is 
entitled to refuse payment to the main contractor where the sub-contractor is 
blameless usually goes unaddressed. Similarly it is easy to envisage situations where 
an unscrupulous main contractor could levy fines and counter-charges against a 
subcontractor who has little option other than putting up with them. 
Delay and Undervaluation of Subcontractor Payments 
A key objective of this study is to investigate cash-flow difficulties being experienced 
by subcontractors due to non-payment on time or in full. Subcontractors should be 
paid in accordance with the terms of their contract. These may be: 
 within a certain time, stated in the particular contract, after their application for 
payment; 
 within a certain time, stated in the particular contract, after the main contractor has 
been paid – the pay when paid clause; or 
 within thirty days of application in accordance with the Prompt Payment of 
Accounts Act 2002. 
It is clear that in many cases these requirements are not being complied with and that 
cash-flow is disrupted as a result. 
It is also important to establish whether a payment is undervalued. Unresolved 
payment claims may develop into disputes which typically fall into two categories: 
 Those in which the debt is not disputed; and 
 Those in which the debt is disputed. 
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Where the debt is not disputed the subcontractor must either wait or take action to 
recover the money. The response varies from chasing the payment more vigorously, 
improving credit management systems to the use of debt recovery agencies or legal 
action. Delaney (cited in Bowen 2007) identifies inadequate response to late payment 
as a key factor in perpetuating the culture of late payment. He claimed that inadequate 
credit management policies and overly defensive attitudes are significant weaknesses 
in many construction firms. This aspect was also commented on by a CIF spokesman 
(reported in Bowen, 2007) who observed that acquiescing in late payment indicates to 
main contractors that this practice is acceptable. He viewed this as a lack of 
professionalism on both sides with the subcontractor displaying poor debt 
management skills and the main contractor abusing his dominant position. Bowen‟s 
study also reported the experience of a Prominent Chartered QS who remarked that 
payment delays were often due to ineffective contract administration and that 
subcontract payment applications were often submitted too late for inclusion in the 
main contractor‟s progress application or were sent to the wrong person, or indeed, 
the wrong place. Clearer communication is obviously required in these instances. 
The reason for delayed payment is not always the subcontractor‟s fault. Perhaps the 
main contractor‟s quantity surveyor is too busy, or is not inclined to, or is incapable of 
processing the work within the deadlines. It may also be the policy of the company to 
optimise cash flow by delaying payment to downstream contractors – the so called 
reluctant payer. 
The situation becomes more complicated where the payment amount is disputed. 
Disputes may arise over numerous matters relating to the amount of work completed 
and how it should be valued; this has been touched upon above. Disagreements are 
common over the evaluation of preliminaries, prime cost and provisional work, 
variations, material and labour price variation accounts, and prolongation and 
disruption claims. The actual cost of these variables can only be ascertained fully after 
the works have been carried out. In addition disputes may arise as a result of alleged 
defective work or failure to protect work. Counter charges for delaying or damaging 
other work may also be imposed. 
The Adjudication Reporting Centre of Glasgow Caledonian University tabulated the 
primary subjects of disputes in the UK between the years 2004 and 2008. and is 
reported in the Regulatory Impact Appraisal (RIA) carried out by the Department of 
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Public Enterprise and Reform (DPER) following the passage of the Bill through the 
Seanad. Their findings are set out in figure 2.6  
 
Fig 2.6 Primary Subjects of Dispute in the UK (Source DPER, 2012) 
It is clear that the valuation of the Final Account is the most common source of 
disputes submitted to adjudication in the UK. The RIA suggests that this may simply 
be due to the fact that most disputes are referred to adjudication following practical 
completion and would therefore inevitably impact on the Final Account. The 
Appraisal, nevertheless, identified that the vast majority of disputes were payment 
related. (DPER, 2011) 
A particular effect of disputed payments which impacts on cash-flow is that claimants 
are rarely fully reimbursed for the cost of work pending the resolution of their dispute. 
Contractors typically adopt a cautious stance when estimating the value of disputed 
subcontract issues and are wary of the risk of overpaying for the work, which may 
subsequently prove to be difficult and embarrassing to recover. Disputes, 
nevertheless, must eventually be resolved and this often occurs during the final 
account phase after the project has been completed. Subcontractors who may already 
have waited a considerable amount of time may become impatient with a main 
contractor who delays and/or frustrates the agreement of outstanding accounts and be 
„forced to the table‟ to accept a poor „final offer‟ from a main contractor employing 
these tactics. It is likely that a quick means of resolving disputes would have a 
beneficial effect on cash-flow in such instances. 
It is important, therefore, that the subcontractor submits clear, timely and accurate 
payment applications to enable the contractor‟s quantity surveyor to process the 
application as quickly and easily as possible. The practice of overclaiming for work-
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in-progress should also be avoided as the discovery of overpriced work may lead to 
unwarranted defensive cuts or the return of the application unprocessed. 
One of the major dilemmas facing subcontractors is potential damage that might be 
caused to working relationships as a result of a more determined approach to debt 
recovery or threatening to take legal action. ISME (2013) commenting on current 
statutory payment provisions expresses this problem forcefully: 
Allowing SMEs to charge 8% rather than 7% on late payment is a sick joke, as 
small businesses are already being told that they will lose business if they even 
attempt to charge the current rate. This market power and corresponding fear 
of harming commercial relationships is not being addressed by the new [EU] 
directive. Another example of „being seen to do something‟ 
This sentiment is echoed in Bowen (2007) where a research participant, a senior 
manager in a large contracting organisation, observed that „generally contractors do 
not work with those subcontractors after legal action has been taken but there have 
been occasions in the past where the relationship can built up again.‟ This seems to 
produce a situation of being damned if you do and damned if you don‟t. It seems clear 
that subcontractors need to be careful and that checks should be carried out on the 
main contractor‟s financial status and record of paying subcontractors before 
advancing or extending credit facilities. However, in the current climate these risks 
are often ignored in the struggle to obtain work. 
The Construction Contracts Bill 2010 
The Bill was introduced in the Seanad by Senator Feargal Quinn on 12
th
 May 2010 
against a backdrop of almost ten Construction Industry failures per week during 2009. 
The Senator‟s objectives were to  
“improve payment practices in the Construction Industry by providing clarity 
and transparency in the payment of monies due in construction contracts. This 
will improve crucial cash-flow to those sub-contractors working in the 
Industry, thus helping companies in the construction sector to survive and 
keep people in employment”. (Oireachtas, 2010) 
Minister of State, Brian Hayes TD in moving the Second Stage of the Bill on 3
rd
 May 
2012 remarked that 
“While there is strong anecdotal of the practice of delayed or non-payment 
having escalated in recent times, it should be noted that the problem is not 
new. It is reported that many firms, mainly subcontractors, are experiencing 
serious difficulty in obtaining payment for work done. It is therefore important 
that where possible, payment transactions within this sector should be 
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facilitated to ensure prompt payment of the correct amount”. Oireachtas, 
2012a) 
The Minister described many construction contracts as being „far too imprecise‟ and 
not cost effective. The Bill provides statutory arrangements including interim 
payments to address the issue of non-payment to constructors who have properly 
completed their work. It also proposes adjudication to speed up dispute resolution 
procedures. These measures are designed to reduce the constructor‟s financial 
exposure to non-payment. The Minister acknowledged that the Bill cannot address 
many of the reasons for late or non-payment, particularly instances involving business 
failure and insolvency. 
The Bill, contains twelve sections and one schedule and is attached as Appendix C. 
The Contents Page of the Bill is reproduced in Figure 2 5. This study focuses on the 
provisions relating to payment and cash flow contained in the Bill. 
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Figure 2.5 Arrangement of Section Construction Contracts Bill 2010 
Section 1 Interpretation 
Section 1 of the Bill defines the terminology used. For example, „construction 
operations‟ are widely interpreted and covers numerous diverse activities ranging 
from major civil engineering infrastructure projects to artistic works attached to real 
estate. 
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Section 2 Construction Contracts: Exceptions etc 
Section 2 concerns the application of the Bill. Subsection (1) excludes a range of 
contracts which fall below certain value or area thresholds. 
1. publicly funded contracts under €50,000 in value. 
2. private owner-occupied dwellings over €200,000 in value provided these are 
less than 200 square metres in area 
3. other contracts not exceeding €200,000 in value. 
Public private partnerships are also excluded from the application of the Bill. 
Section 3 Payment Provisions 
Section 3 concerns payment provisions. Contracts covered by the Bill must: 
1. identify either the amount of each interim payment and the final payment to be 
made under the contract, or provide an „adequate mechanism‟ to establish 
these sums. 
2. identify either the payment claim dates or an adequate mechanism to 
determine these and stipulate the maximum period in which these payments 
must be made. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 concern the application of the Schedule. The Schedule applies to 
contracts which do not include the two provisions above. It also applies to 
subcontracts unless the particular subcontract contains more favourable credit terms 
for the subcontractor than those it provides for. The Schedule provides that payments 
claims be made 30 days after the commencement of the contract and at 30 day 
intervals thereafter until substantial completion is achieved: the final payment claim is 
to be made 30 days following final completion. On short duration contracts, not 
exceeding 45 days, the payment claim date is to be 14 days following completion of 
the work. Payments become due 30 days after the payment claim date. 
Section 3.5 prohibits the use of „pay when paid‟ except in limited circumstances set 
out in Sub-section 6 which involve various matters relating to insolvency. 
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Section 4 Payment Claim Notices 
Section 4 details the procedures for claiming and making payment and provides the 
payer with the opportunity to set-off claims for loss/expense and damage from the 
payment claim made by the contractor. Under this Section the contractor or 
subcontractor, submits a payment claim notice specifying the amount claimed and 
provides supporting particulars within five days of the payment claim date to their 
employer. If the employer contests the claimed amount they must respond to the 
claimant within 21 days of the payment claim date specifying the payment amount 
proposed, the reasons for the difference and the related calculations. 
If one or more of the reasons for the difference relate to claims to set off loss and/or 
expense due to alleged breach(es) of „any contractual or other obligation of the 
executing party (under the construction contract or otherwise) or any other claim that 
the other person alleges against the executing party‟, the response must identify the 
basis, particulars and calculations for each such claim. If these matters are not settled 
by the date on which the amount is due, the employer is required to pay the claimed 
amount in full. 
Section 5 Actions regarding non-payment 
Section 5 of the Bill establishes a contractor‟s right to suspend work for a period of up 
to fourteen days for non-payment in full by the due date. This right is subject to 
providing two written notices: the first not earlier than the day after payment was due 
and the second seven days prior to proposing to suspend the work, specifying the 
grounds for the threatened suspension. Work may not be suspended after payment has 
been received or following the end of the fourteen day suspension period. The 
contractor will be entitled to extra time to complete the works due to the suspension 
where this is accepted, or found to be, justified. No extension of time will be due on a 
main contract where the work is delayed because a subcontractor has suspended the 
work. In such cases, however, where justified, the subcontractor would be entitled to 
extra time. 
Sections 6 to 11 Adjudication and Other Payment Related Matters 
Of the remaining sections of the Bill, Sections 6 to 9 relate to the adjudication process 
which is establishes a right to refer payment disputes to adjudication; the right to 
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suspend works for failure to comply with an adjudicators decision; the selection of a 
panel of adjudicators and the code of practice for adjudication. The main points of 
these sections relating to payments and cash-flow implications are outlined below. 
Sections 10 and 11 relate to delivery of notices, etc and the short title and 
commencement arrangements for the legislation respectively, these bear only 
marginal relevance to the study and are not examined in further detail. 
Section 6 stipulates that a construction contract cannot be drafted to exclude recourse 
to adjudication and sets out the procedures for initiating and conducting the process. 
The appointment of the adjudicator may be agreed within five days of serving notice 
to proceed to adjudication or arrangements are commenced to appoint an adjudicator 
from a panel selected by the Minister. The payment dispute must be referred to the 
appointed adjudicator within seven days. The decision of the adjudicator is normally 
scheduled to be delivered within a 28 day period from referral. Sub-sections 11 and 
12 provide that:- 
(11) subject to subsection (12), the decision of the adjudicator shall be binding 
until the payment dispute is finally settled by the parties 
 
(12) The decision of the adjudicator shall not be binding if the payment 
dispute is referred to arbitrations or proceedings are otherwise initiated in 
relation to the decision unless the parties agree to accept the decision as 
finally determining the payment dispute. 
Each party bears his own costs and pays the adjudicator‟s cost in accordance with the 
decision. Failure to comply with an adjudicator‟s decision gives rise to grounds to 
suspend work. The procedures relating to suspending work echo the provisions of 
Section 5 discussed above. 
Analysis of the Payment Provisions of the Bill 
The principle objectives of Senator Quinn‟s Bill are to ensure prompt payment and to 
enable payment disputes to be resolved quickly and economically. The construction 
professions and industry representative bodies support the introduction of legislation 
to achieve these objectives. Nevertheless submissions by institutions such as the 
Society of Chartered Surveyors (SCSI) have concluded that the Bill, as currently 
drafted, fails to achieve the objectives, and could leave many contractors and 
subcontractors in a worse position than at present (SCSI, 2011) 
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The Regulatory Impact Appraisal (DPER, 2011) reported that most construction 
contracts are carried out on an informal basis with no written contract in place. There 
are no minimum standards in relation to payment and the timing of such payment. 
The sector is small which means that where there is a contract that the bulk of the 
power rests with the main contractor. 
The RIA examined three potential outcomes: to do nothing; to enact the Bill as passed 
by the Seanad, and to consider possible amendments to the Bill. The Appraisal 
concluded that if nothing was done the status quo would persist, and the 
competitiveness and solvency of SMEs would be compromised. This was seen as a 
negative. The impact of enacting the un-amended Bill would incur small 
administrative costs but would provide a substantial benefit in furthering national 
competitiveness whilst safeguarding public money. The Appraisal also outlined a 
number of possible amendments to the Bill of which four were examined in some 
detail: 
1. a requirement to establish a guarantee account; 
2. reducing or removing the scope thresholds 
3. temporary binding adjudication regardless of referral to arbitration 
4. extending the scope to bespoke products manufactured for the project (DPER, 
2011). 
The Bill received its second stage reading in the Dail during May and June 2012. 
Forty nine deputies contributed to the debate, and while the Bill was unanimously 
welcomed, many of the deputies expressed regret that similar measures were not in 
place before the economic collapse. Many of contributors described the plight of 
small contractors in their constituencies and were angry that they had not paid by 
main contractors, particularly for work on public sector contacts. The speakers, in the 
main, supported the recommendations set out in the RIA. It was clear that they were 
particularly concerned over the application thresholds which were seen as being too 
high and contrary to the purpose and intent of the Bill. A number of deputies also 
called for the meaning of „bespoke products‟ to be expanded to include materials such 
as concrete, blocks and general building supplies which could not be recovered once 
incorporated in the Works. These and other matters are examined in the following 
analysis of the payment provisions of the Bill. 
 
25 
Security of Payment 
At present the Bill does not provide for establishing a „project bank account.‟ The 
RIA comments that whilst the provision has its merits it would likely add a 
unwarranted regulatory imposition and increase construction costs. It argues that the 
cost of providing a bond at present could be high and might further deteriorate a 
smaller contractor‟s cash flow thereby reducing competition and competitiveness. The 
Assessment records that there is little data on the extent of non payment within the 
industry and what information there is, is anecdotal in nature. The Appraisal questions 
whether the extent of the problem warrants insuring against it. The Appraisal 
proceeds to examine why exposure to non payment arises and indicates that 
frequently this is due to lack of formal contractual arrangements, absence of interim 
provisions and/or including pay when paid clauses in the contract and, the 
disincentive effect of expensive, time consuming dispute resolution procedures in 
obtaining full reimbursement. The Appraisal argues that Bill addresses the last three 
of these issues thereby reducing the exposure of subcontractors to non payment. 
Deputy Mick Wallace provided a graphic illustration of a sub contractor‟s exposure to 
risk of non payment by a main contractor. „As a subcontractor, I worked for one of the 
biggest builders in the country . . . I did £170,000 worth of work for him, labour only, 
and he gave me £150,000. I told him he still owed me £20,000 and he told me to go to 
hell, that he had given me enough‟. Deputy Wallace added that he was not alone in 
being treated in this manner and that he eventually recovered some of the money by 
another „unorthodox route‟. (Oireachtas, 2012a) 
A number of deputies called for a means of ring fencing of money for sub contractors. 
For example, Deputy Mary Lou McDonald supported the call from the Mechanical 
and Electrical Contractors Associations for the inclusion of a trust clause. She 
reported the Association‟s claim that the largest six main contractors that failed in the 
years 2010 and 2011 left unpaid debts of over €500 million. „On this basis, a statutory 
trust provision is required, as applies, for instance, under Canadian law. We must 
look at this issue of ring-fencing moneys paid by the payer to the payee for work 
completed by subcontractors.‟ (Oireachtas 2012a) 
The submission made by the Society of Chartered Surveyors in Ireland (SCSI) on the 
Bill in April 2012 argued that „without security of payment the point of this piece of 
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legislation would be lost and the Bill would be utterly meaningless‟. The Society 
observed that main contractors engaged on public sector contracts rarely have issues 
regarding security of payment. However they suggest that establishing a project 
account similar that provided for under the existing RIAI contracts could provide 
security through the supply chain by providing the ability to pay subcontractors 
directly. (SCSI, 2012) 
McCaul (2011) reports a Prominent Chartered QS as believing that requirement to 
operate a security bank account would strengthen the current Bill. He referred to 
Senator Quinn‟s original objectives to free up payments by ensuring „timely payment, 
. . the size of the payment, . . enforcement of entitlements and . . . the money is there. 
Now that is not in the Contracts Bill at the moment. If the moneys not there nobody 
gets paid.” He views one of the reasons for builders failing is that there is no money 
in the production chain as banks are not lending to developers. He notes that 
guarantee accounts are already provided for in Clause 35 of the RIAI Contract but that 
this clause „is invariably struck out by clients. If there could be a similar clause in the 
Construction Contracts Bill [which would be replenished by the employer as 
certificates were presented] it would achieve what Senator Quinn hoped to achieve by 
way of ensuring the money is there.‟ He admits however that clients „are not 
delighted‟ with such arrangements. 
Section 2 Construction Contracts: Exceptions etc 
The RIA notes that the Bill does not apply to contracts below certain value thresholds, 
nor to private residential projects except for so called „trophy homes‟. The 
Assessment reports that including small commercial and domestic residential projects 
within the scope of the legislation was considered to impose a disproportionate burden 
on the contracting parties. It contends that a proportionate and fair regulatory response 
is required in response to the concerns of the various stakeholders and that „on 
balance it would appear that the thresholds should be reviewed.‟ (DPER, 2011) 
Industry reaction to the proposed thresholds and scope restrictions has largely been 
negative. The Bill, as currently drafted covers non domestic construction contracts 
over €50,000 and €200,000 in the public and private sectors respectively. However 
the bulk, if not all, of the work on these contracts is carried out by sub-contractors 
with the main contractor typically performing a management role. The Bill contains 
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obvious gaps in dealing with this situation as the current thresholds effectively 
exclude not only the majority of repair, maintenance and improvement projects, but 
also subcontracts and material and equipment supply contracts. The CIF contended 
that „the legislation will not apply to the majority of sub-contractors, the group of 
people who are in greatest need of protections offered by this legislation‟ (CIF, 2011) 
A CIF spokesman is quoted in McCaul (2011) as saying that the Bill should „apply to 
all construction contracts. If smaller contracts are excluded what you have done is 
bring in a solution for the larger contractors, a solution which is cheap and swift 
while at the smaller [contracting] end of the market you force them into more 
expensive arbitration.‟ 
The SCSI (2011) view the thresholds as „inappropriately blunt.‟ and that unless „the 
[€200,000 private sector] threshold is not removed entirely that the legislation will 
have been a complete waste of time.‟ They also recommend that the distinction 
between public sector and private sector projects should be omitted, claiming that 
such a distinction 
“is likely to cause difficulties in that many sub-contracts will be private 
contracts and yet the main contract will be state funded and for various tiers of 
a project to be included or not included will inevitably give rise to confusion, 
dispute or unfairness in the process. It is imperative that this Act is 
unambiguous and clear and that it applies to all tiers of a project.” 
A Prominent Chartered QS viewed the value thresholds in the Bill as a serious issue. 
„It doesn‟t apply to projects less than €200,000. It is designed to protect the sub-
contract industry, the next layer down from the RIAI contracts and it doesn‟t do so. It 
will have no benefit to sub-contractors and sub-contractors cash flow if that is to 
remain.‟ A Principal of an Architectural Practice believes that it would be beneficial 
to incorporate the residential market under the legislation. “I think that the residential 
market is where a lot of the problems arise. I think you need the legislative equivalent 
of the small claims court.” (both quoted in McCaul, 2011) 
It may also be suggested that public sector projects over €50,000 and private sector 
„commercial‟ contracts over €200,000 would normally be in writing and the current 
Bill provisions would only apply in isolated cases. 
Within Leinster House there was widespread agreement that the thresholds must be 
reviewed with over twenty five deputies commenting on this matter during the 
debates. Deputy Mick Wallace, for example, described the current €200,000 threshold 
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as a „joke and will completely nullify the good the Bill might do‟ He added “Those 
sub-contractors carrying out work on contracts valued at more than this amount have 
a far better chance of receiving payment than their smaller counterparts . . . [who] 
are in an extremely vulnerable position and require the protection provided by the 
legislation.” He called for contracts above €10,000 to be covered by the Bill. Minister 
of State Hayes in his closing remarks has indicated his intention “to bring forward 
amendments to broaden its scope by reducing or removing altogether the current 
monetary thresholds in the Bill” and to extend the “legislation to include bespoke 
construction supply contracts”. (Oireachtas 2012a, 2012d) 
Section 3 Payment Provisions 
Payments 
The primary purpose of the Bill is to free up cash-flow within the Industry by 
ensuring timely payment, improving communication regarding deductions from 
payment claims and providing mechanisms to enforce entitlements. 
The contract must identify or include an „adequate mechanism‟ to establish the 
payment claim dates and each interim and final payment amount. The contract must 
also stipulate the maximum period for making payments otherwise the Schedule 
provisions of 30 day intervals will apply unless the particular subcontract contains 
more favourable credit terms for the subcontractor. On contracts not exceeding 45 
days, the payment claim date is to be 14 days following completion of the work and 
payment become due 30 days later. 
Pay when paid clauses 
Section 3.5 of the Bill seeks to prohibit „pay when paid‟ arrangements except in 
limited circumstances usually involving employer insolvency. Minister of State Hayes 
views this as „a significant change‟. Deputy Willie Penrose described it as a 
„breakthrough‟ with Deputy Stephen Donnelly adding that it would address a „serious 
power imbalance in the sector”. Deputy Dara Calleary, however questioned how the 
provision would be enforced. „We can make legislation, but enforcement and 
breaking what has been a culture for decades . . .will be a bigger job.‟ (Oireachtas, 
2012a and 2012b) Knowles (2002), commenting on the prohibition of pay when paid 
arrangements following the enactment of 1996 UK Construction Act, hinted that some 
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main contractors may have retained their pay when paid clauses leaving 
subcontractors to complain that their contract does not comply with the Act.  
A CIF spokesman welcomes the prohibition of paid when paid clauses. He accepts 
that such arrangements are the de facto standard payment situation in Ireland and 
notes that such clauses are likely to be declared illegal as „grossly unfair‟ under the 
incoming EU Directive on late payment. (quoted in McCaul, 2011) 
The SCSI (2012) however raises a cautionary note on „pay when paid.‟ They claim 
that main contractors typically provide 20% to 25% of the project finance with the 
balance being funded by subcontractors and suppliers. Banning pay when paid 
clauses, would force contractors to pay subcontractors within 25 days of receiving a 
payment notice. This would normally be before they are themselves paid, thereby 
requiring increased credit facilities in the current difficult economic climate. Whilst 
they suggest that this might be laudable, they warn that it will introduce a barrier to 
entry into the Industry, or will limit smaller companies ability to compete with larger 
contractors. 
Certification Issues 
A particular characteristic of the construction payment process is that the payment 
cycle is typically dependent on certification by employer‟s representatives, architects 
and consultant engineers under the main contract. The SCSI (2012) claims that Clause 
3.5 cuts across this process. The Society warns that eliminating independent 
certification could affect nominated subcontractors payments in particular, as amounts 
due to these subcontractors currently must be separately identified by the certifier in 
interim certificates. They advise that independent certification should be maintained 
as courts view this practice as a key element in effective contracts and that it provides 
certainty for the contracting parties involved. The Society claims that the removal of 
the ability of a main contractor to agree payment terms with a subcontractor would be 
a new concept for the Industry. They argue that this will allow main contractors to self 
certify the amounts to be paid to subcontractors. The Society warns that particular 
instances such as certifying whether subcontract work is complete could potentially 
cause „endless disputes‟. 
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Section Four Payment Claim Notices 
This section sets out the detailed procedures for claiming payment. Minister of State 
Hayes, contends that in the event that a payment claim is disputed that the parties will 
now be clear about the basis for and the amount in dispute. 
A CIF Spokesman (reported in McCaul, 2011) views this as one of the main benefits 
of the legislation noting that a proper account must first be submitted in order to avail 
of the remedies in the Bill. He added that „parties to construction contracts [will] be 
more conscious of the terms of the agreement and be far more ordered in the way they 
claim money. . . Ad hoc practices [of haphazard claim submittals] will disappear; 
well they will diminish considerably.‟ 
McCaul, (2011) refers to the practice of payers using claims for loss or damage as an 
excuse for not paying, even for those elements of work over which there is no dispute. 
He reports the approach of a Principal of an Architectural Practice in dealing with 
such situations “I think that main contractors shamefully make use of that approach 
all the time [the dispute over €10,000 of a €100,000 bill stopping payment being 
made]. 
“I think the problem is, particularly in the last couple of years, that there is so 
little work going around that the sub-contractor does not want to fall foul of 
the main contractors. I think the increasing number of sub-contractors which 
are going to the wall is not because they are not trading properly but because 
of cash flow; not having the money passed onto them is a major problem. . . If 
I get wind that a sub-contractor is not getting paid, I will force the main 
contractor to pay him before I release another cert.” 
The SCSI (2012) contend that a contractor should submit the payment claim notice on 
or before the payment date rather than within five days of the payment claim date to 
their employer. They claim that the five day time allowance potentially reduces the 
employer‟s response time to 16 instead of 21 days, which may impact negatively on 
the ability to carry out a full assessment of the claim within the allotted and may give 
rise to disputes. 
Deputy Mary Lou McDonald noted that this Section does not provide for occasions 
where a payer does not respond to a payment claim. She suggests that the full claim 
should be paid in such instances and that this would encourage main contractors to 
respond to disputed payment claims. (Oireachtas, 2012a). There was little further 
comment on this particular section during the Dail debate. 
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Section 5 Actions regarding non-payment 
Right to Suspend Work 
Minister of State Hayes claims that the right of a subcontractor to suspend work if a 
contractor wrongly fails to pay in accordance with the Bill, will „rebalance the power 
between the contracting parties, without unduly hampering the completion of the 
project.‟ This viewpoint, however, was disputed by a number of deputies during the 
debates. Deputy Mary Lou McDonald expressed the view of her party  
“that the right to suspend work for non payment cannot be restricted to two 
weeks. This will not act as a sufficient deterrent under the law. If the 
Government was to persist with the two week suspension limit it would 
undermine the purpose of the provision. It would be unreasonable to ask 
subcontractors to go back to work after two weeks having still not been paid 
and to incur further costs.”  
Deputy Sean Fleming referred to subcontractors crawling back on day 15: „That is no 
good and that subcontractor is probably in a worse position crawling back onto the 
site to resume the work. That must be re-examined‟ he said. Deputy Mick Wallace, 
taking a main contractor‟s perspective, warned that the current provisions presented 
dangers: 
“on occasion a main contractor could be getting a raw deal from the 
subcontractor. For example, such a subcontractor might not do the work right 
and could then state he was not going to do any further work until he was paid. 
If there is going to be a period during which the adjudication panel will try to 
ascertain where the truth lies and who owes what to whom, it would not be fair 
to bring work to a halt during that period.” 
Minister of State Hayes has agreed that „the two week time limit preventing 
contractors from withdrawing services in the event of non-payment where work has 
been carried out to a satisfactory standard seems insufficient and, therefore will need 
to be amended.‟ (Oireachtas, 2012a, 2012c and 2012d) 
Industry opinion is also critical of the provisions. The SCSI (2012) notes that the Bill 
removes a widely used contractual remedy, which provides contractors with the 
option to determine their own employment in the event that payment is not made by 
the end of the period of suspension. They claim that affected contractors and 
subcontractors will be obliged to resume the works after the 14 days of suspension 
without payment, while remaining exposed to the risk of termination if they fail to 
return to work. The Society contends that the right of the affected subcontractor to 
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terminate should be preserved or enshrined in the legislation. The Society also argues 
that reasonable delay, remobilisation and rectification costs caused by the suspension 
of work should be reimbursed and likewise additional time should be allowed. 
A Prominent Chartered QS views this aspect of the proposed legislation as a 
„dangerous issue.‟ He claims: 
“You can suspend in the RIAI for non payment. You can terminate for non 
payment, if you do not have a contract you would not have the ability to 
suspend, and what this does, is it brings this ability to suspend. So for people 
who have no contracts at all you can suspend. However, you can only suspend 
for fourteen days. In such circumstances you cannot terminate you must return 
to work. It does then provide a benefit for someone who would not habitually 
sign a contract, albeit a temporary benefit, it actually cuts across the traditional 
RIAI form and worsens matters for all those people who sign contracts.” 
(quoted in McCaul, 2011) 
A CIF Spokesman claims that “In Ireland it is hard to stop working once a contract is 
started. . . . The idea that you can only suspend work for fourteen days, under the 
proposed legislation, and then have to return to work is not workable. It will likely be 
amended.” (quoted in McCaul, 2011) 
Adjudication Provisions 
A detailed analysis of the Adjudication provisions is beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless it is a key component of the Bill and is the means by which „payment 
disputes‟ may be resolved. As currently drafted, the Bill holds that an adjudicator‟s 
decision is binding unless referred to arbitration or litigation. This has identified as a 
particular weakness in the Bill. Deputy Olivia Mitchell remarked that „The real 
danger is that the new adjudication process would be used as another time waster 
before one got to conciliation and so on, postponing court appearances for as long as 
possible‟. Deputy Mary Lou McDonald added that this approach „often suits large 
contractors with significant resources behind them to drag out challenges to non 
payment through existing processes or through the courts.‟ Minister of State Hayes 
has indicated that that the best option is to make adjudicators awards binding but this 
is “complex. We have to get the balance right between giving this legislation the 
necessary enforcement provisions and ensuring its application is equitable and the 
taxpayer is safeguarded” (Oireachtas, 2012a, 2012d) 
Industry reaction has also been critical of the perceived weakness of the adjudication 
proposals. A CIF Spokesman believes that the idea that the adjudication is not binding 
 
33 
in the interim “is just lunacy” adding that “ Either party can refer the dispute on to 
arbitration or litigation and the other party need not pay until the matter is resolved. . 
. The big concept in the Bill is that you could resolve the dispute and get paid, at least 
in the interim.” He claims that this element of the Bill is seen as the single most 
important factor in freeing up cash flow in the UK. A Prominent Chartered QS agrees 
adding that “the inability to enforce the adjudication award in the face of arbitration 
referral is a major disaster. You can‟t progress the award.” (both quoted in McCaul, 
2011) 
The second stage readings of the Bill revealed that there was near unanimous support 
for its implementation. Nevertheless it was clear that there were several weaknesses in 
the proposals which need to be addressed. Minister of State Hayes‟ closing remarks 
included a commitment to introduce various amendments at Committee stage to 
improve the operation of the Bill. These include reviewing the current value threshold 
and suspension of work provisions, broadening the range of suppliers covered, and 
introducing robust adjudication provisions. 
Industry representatives interviewed by McCaul (2011) believe, that provided the 
necessary amendments are incorporated, the Bill will be beneficial. A CIF Spokesman 
believes that “The Construction Contracts Bill, depending on its terms when it is 
enacted will certainly make a difference.” A Prominent Chartered QS believes that the 
Bill will help improve cash flow “in principle, yes, based on the assumption that the 
current Bill is changed. It won‟t in its current form unless it is changed.” It may also 
be suggested that the cool reception for the Bill by the Construction Professions and 
industry representative bodies may be significantly warmer following the Committee 
Stage deliberations. 
International initiatives 
The problem of late payment is not confined to Ireland and this issue has been 
addressed by various legislative initiatives abroad. Of particular relevance is the UK 
Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (The UK Act) which was 
prompted by the recommendations of the Latham Report (1994). Comparable 
legislation has also been introduced in New Zealand 2002, Singapore 2004, Isle of 
Man 2004 and various Australian States between 1999 and 2004. The UK legislation 
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has been updated in 2010 following a review of the legislation by the UK Office of 
Government Commerce. 
The 1996 UK Construction Act implemented the following provisions on all 
construction projects: 
 pay when paid clauses are unenforceable; 
 payment by instalment for all contracts over 45 days duration; 
 the contractor is to be informed when payment is due as well as the amount; 
 the contractor is to be informed if the client is to withhold payment; 
 the contractor has the right to withdraw from the site if not paid within a specified 
period. (Cartlidge, 2013) 
These requirements closely echo the provisions of the Irish Bill. The question is - has 
the UK legislation been effective in improving payment practice?  
In his budget statement of March 2004, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that: 
“Following concerns expressed by the construction industry on unreasonable 
delays in payment, the government will review the operation of the 
adjudication and payment provisions [of the Act] . . . to identify what 
improvement can be made”. 
The review was carried out under the chairmanship of Sir Michael Latham and the 
report which was published on 17
th
 September 2004 concluded that while the Act was 
generally working well, particularly with regard to adjudication, that „poor payment 
practices continue to be a major issue‟. (DTI 2007) 
The Payment Practice Group considered ten specific issues which were identified as 
causing difficulties in achieving the Act‟s objectives. Of particular relevance was the 
observation that a loophole of using „pay when certified‟ clauses was widespread 
practice and this has the same effect as „pay when paid‟ clauses. The group also 
expressed concern over the length of the payment periods and identified that „some 
agreements appear to have made this intervening period as long as 180 days.‟ The 
group observed that this problem is often due to payment abuse rather than 
contractual agreement. The group admitted that it could „identify no effective measure 
to prevent any lengthening in contractual payment periods.‟ (Latham, 2004) 
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Sir Michael in his covering letter to the then Construction Minister, Nigel Griffiths 
MP presented his views on the progress achieved by the Act. It was obvious that 
progress was somewhat disappointing. 
So one must be looking all the time to ensuring that the correct amount of 
money is paid on time. The correct amount may not be what is offered or what 
is demanded. It must properly reflect the satisfactory work which has actually 
been done in accordance with the contract. Moreover “on time” should reflect 
the contractual agreement between the parties. “Late payment” is not an 
abstract concept. It should be assessed against a time which has been mutually 
agreed in the contract, rather than some vague notion of what a desirable 
timescale is. If the parties have agreed to a 90 days payment cycle, a 90 day 
payment is not “late”. But if they have signed a contract for a shorter period, 
and the payment is not made until 90 days that is late and the aggrieved party 
already has statutory rights of adjudication and/or suspension. Nobody has a 
right simply to be paid what they demand, because that may not be the correct 
amount. But equally, they do have a right to be paid that correct amount on 
time, irrespective of whether other parties in the supply chain have themselves 
been paid. That is not transference of risk or altering the balance. It is quite 
simply, reinforcing and honouring the contractual agreement between the 
parties. . . .the general principle of proper payment on time must hold good. 
(His emphasis) 
He continued later 
Where there is an adversarial relationship from the start of the process . . . 
there are likely to be irreconcilable commercial approaches to payment by the 
demand and supply sides. The Construction Act has not yet achieved a balance 
outcome between them all, though it has certainly dealt with dome of the least 
desirable practices. 
In 2005 Odeyinka and Akintoye carried out a survey of contractors‟ satisfaction with 
payment terms influencing construction cashflow. The survey received 100 responses, 
30 of which were from subcontractors. They found that while main contractors were 
generally satisfied with contractual payment terms, they were dissatisfied about 
payment time lags and the percentage of the contract sum retained. The 
subcontractors surveyed were dissatisfied with payment methods, payment time lags 
and highly dissatisfied about amounts retained. Their study called for „innovative 
payment systems to be devised that will not put the subcontractor at a disadvantage 
by putting him at the end of a long payment chain.‟  
Following Latham‟s 2004 Report an industry-wide consultation and analysis process 
ensued and Improving Payment Practices in the Construction Industry: 2
nd
 
Consultation on Proposals to Amend Part II of the Housing Grants Construction and 
Regeneration Act 1996 and the Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and 
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Wales) Regulations 1998, was published in 2007 which proposed a number of 
modifications and improvements to the 1996 Act The 1996 Act was superseded by the 
Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. (Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors 2013) Many of the provisions and modifications of 
the UK 2009 Act have been incorporated in the Irish Bill or have been submitted by 
the professional bodies as part of the second stage process. 
Further afield, Ramachandra and Rotimi (2012) reporting on the performance of New 
Zealand legislation found that „payment delays are still prevalent within the industry‟ 
ten years after the introduction of New Zealand Construction Contracts Act. They 
report that main contractors experienced delays in being paid on between 10-40% of 
contracts while subcontractors fared much worse, experiencing delays in the range of 
10% to 80% of contracts. Consultants and contractors judged the legislation to 
moderately and slightly effective respectively. 
In New South Wales, Brand and Uher (2010) found that the object of the New South 
Wales Act is „generally being achieved.‟ They concluded that „the culture of making 
late payments remains well entrenched in the construction industry‟. Their follow-up 
survey of 317 contractors and subcontractors revealed „a modest downward trend in 
the frequency of late payments‟. They found that „78% of firms generally experience 
late payment to varying degrees of severity, with almost half indicating that they 
receive late payment „often‟ or „always‟. They also found that many contractors and 
sub-contractors have limited knowledge of the Act and are under-utilising the very 
legislation designed for their benefit. 
There are difficulties in making direct comparisons with the UK and international 
experience. Various factors such as market size and other „unknown‟ factors such as 
levels of compliance and size of the hidden economy may render such benchmarking 
somewhat unreliable.(DPER, 2012) Nevertheless international experience, provides 
valuable insight and feedback which may help to predict what might occur should 
comparable legislation be enacted in Ireland. 
Conclusion. 
The question remains will the proposed legislation be effective change the ingrained 
culture of delayed and inadequate payment within the industry. The current ISME 
credit watch survey would suggest that the world is full of people who do not pay 
 
37 
their bills on time. This review has shown that cash-flow is essential to operating a 
healthy contracting organisation. Despite the fact that main contractors are typically 
paid in arrears they can run positive cash-flow projects by adopting effective 
reimbursement strategies for early and full recovery from clients whilst delaying and 
reducing outgoings to suppliers and subcontractors. The market in the construction 
industry is far from perfect and subcontractors suffer from a lack of security of 
employment and typically depend on a small number of larger contractors for 
business. This brings about a power imbalance which the Bill seeks to address. This 
review has argued that the Bill is welcome but needs to be modified to address 
industry concerns and practical operational issues. Overseas experience has shown 
that while similar legislative initiatives have delivered benefits, a more critical eye 
might view the results as disappointing. 
People are slow to part with their money and reluctant payers are ever inventive in 
circumventing or ignoring legislation. Nevertheless change is usually a gradual 
process and rarely comes about overnight. The enacting of the Bill will probably be, 
to use the words of a number of deputies, „a step in the right direction‟. This writer‟s 
opening statement, like the Bill, may now need to be modified. It is one thing to 
change the law; changing the culture is another thing entirely. 
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